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PROGRAM DIVERSITY IN THE BROADCAST MEDIA AND THE
FCC: THE SECTION 310(b) LABYRINTH—A DELICATE
BALANCE
INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Speech and Press Clause of the federal
Constitution' was designed to eliminate the threat of federal
censorship.' Consequently, the primary goal of the First Amendment
historically has been considered to be the maintenance of a "market-
place of ideas" from which the truth will emerge, if all facts and view-
points are allowed to compete for acceptances' In recent years a new
avenue to achievement of this primary goal has opened up. It has
been suggested that freedom of expression" should serve as a means
by which to guarantee access to the mass media for minority groups
"'Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ...." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878-86 (1963).
3 As eloquently stated by Judge Learned Hand, "(the First Amendment] presup-
poses that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always
will be, lolly; but we have staked upón it our all." United States v. AsSociated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); accord, Citizens Comm, to
Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
Two other major goals are inherent in the First Amendinent. First, a citizen must
be kept fully informed for democracy to function through an informed electorate. This
interpretation of the First Amendment originated in the writing of Professor Alexander
Meiklejohn. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960). In an earlier work
Meiklejohn stated, "The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues
shall understand them." A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948). Meiklejohn's view of the First Amendment was accepted by
the Warren Court in New York Times Co,' v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Bren-
nan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.
L. REV. I (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 SUP. er. REV. 191, 209, 221.
Second, the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment allows the
personal fulfillment necessary for a healthy society. See 'F. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970), applied in part in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,
1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom, Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeMocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). SS also Emer-
son, supra note 2, at 877. The Supreme Cohn has not given its imprimatur to Professor
Emerson's interpretation of the First Amendtnent as it has to that of Professor Meikle-
john.
' Although the courts continue to, use the traditional language of the First
Amendment, in practical application freedom of speech and press has expanded into a
broader concept of "freedom of expressión," so that the hybrid media born of tech-
nological advancement 'may be logically embraced within its fundamental protection.
Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867 (1972) (hereinafter
cited as Media and the First Amendment). Due to the unique nature of electronic media,
application of the traditional language, "speech" and "press," is strained; modern media
are neither pure speech nor strictly press. Id. at 882-83.
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within American society, in order to insure that the communications
needs of minority audiences are met by broadcasters. 5 If fully im-
plemented, the "right of access" theory would insure that minority in-
terests in transmitting messages would be effectuated through the
mass media, which is arguably the most effective way of reaching a
mass audience.° Alternatively, if the members of the minority group
had no message to convey, the right of access would satisfy' their de-
sires, as listeners, to receive a range of ideas and experiences by im-
posing a duty on broadcasters to structure their programming to ac-
commodate the group's needs.?
The right of access is predicated upon the unique nature
of the electronic media—its ability to quickly and conveniently con-
vey a message—and the physical limitation placed on its availabil-
ity by the existence of a finite number of broadcast frequencies.° In-
deed, the physical characteristics of the electronic media have in the
past provided the rationale for substantial government regulation of
the broadcast industry,° to a degree far more extensive than is per-
missible with regard to the printed press.'° As early as 1934, Congress
recognized the unique difficulties Of the broadcast industry. In that
3 The most prominent scholar advancing the right of access is Jerome Barron.
See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967); Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for
Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. Cow. L. REv. 31, 38 (1964). , See also Barron, The
Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 U. VA. L. REV. 633 (1966).
6 This aspect of the "right of access" theory is affirmative in nature and is an ex-
tension of free speech. See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the
Media?, supra note 5, at 498 -502; Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right,
supra note 5, at 1656-66.
This passive right of access, termed the "right to hear," is the reciprocal of
freedom of speech. Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1970). This "right to hear" is broader than the affirmative right of access because
it insures that listeners will receive desired programming both from the broadcaster
and from speakers who have obtained use of the media through the affirmative right of
access. Id. at 868.
° See Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's
"Fairness" Doctrine, supra note 5, at 38; Comment, The Public Interest in Balanced Pro-
gramming Content: The Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcasters' Format Changes, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 933, 935 (1972) (hereinafter cited as The Public Interest in Balanced Pro-
gramming Content); Comment,.1970 L. & SOCIAL ORDER 424, 428 (1970).
o This "scarcity rationale" has been subjected to strong criticism in recent years.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 158-60
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United,
States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1018-20 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
10 For example, the power of a privately owned newspaper to print its own views
on a variety of matters cannot be subjected to government regulation. In contrast,
broadcasters are required to act as "public trustees," and in discharging this responsibil-
ity may be compelled to program other than what they might prefer to do as private
entrepreneurs. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 117-18 (1973).
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year, through enactment of the Communications Act," Congress
lodged the power to grant and revise station licenses—without which
broadcasters could not legally operate their stations"—in the Federal
Communications Commission.'" The Supreme Court has also demon-
strated an acute awareness of these hybrid and unique characteristics
of the media and, in upholding certain broadcasting regulations
promulgated by the Commission, the Court has accepted the scarcity
rationale as a legitimate reason for government regulation of
broadcasters.' 4
In order to effectuate the right of access, affirmative
regulation by the government through the FCC is required. It is an
asserted economic fact of life that the marketplace does not operate to
afford adequate access to minority segments of society.' 5 The Su-
preme Court has twice been asked to consider the validity of FCC regu-
lation and the concomitant question of the constitutionality of the con-
troversial and conceptually problematic right of access. In Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC" and in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee" the Court suggested that an affirmative
right of access to the electronic media would be consistent with the
First Amendment,'" but that no such right of access is constitutionally
"47 U.S.C. II* 151-609 (1970).
"Id. § 301.
"Id. CI 151.
14 National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13, 226
(1943). This case upheld the constitutionality (d . the FCC's chain broadcasting rules. 47
C.F.R. § 73.658 (1973). These rules had been promulgated to ensure diversity of own-
ership in the Immdcast industry and thereby promote the desired "multitude of
tongues." National Broadcasting, S pro at 218.
To date, the Court has not abandoned the scarcity rationale and, in fact, has re-
lied upon it to uphold the constitutionality of the Commission's personal attack and
reply rules (47 .C.F,R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1973), which require a
broadcaster to provide time to reply to any citizen who has been the subject of an aired
attack on the station. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v, FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969).
15 Media and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 959-61.
10 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
" 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
'" In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I (1945), the Supreme Court
had said, It would be strange indeed .. if the grave concern for freedom of the press
which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that
government was without power to protect that freedom." Id, at 19-20. In Red Lion, the
Court upheld the personal attack and reply rules of the Commission which required the
broadcaster to provide reply time to a person who had been maligned on a Pennsyl-
vania radio station. 395 U.S. at 371. Broad dictum in that case lends support to the
proposition that government action designed to multiply the voices presented to the
public will not abridge die First Amendment: "It is the right of the viewers and listen-
ers, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
Red Lion has been heralded as the case wind, could tnake the right to access a
legal reality. Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward the Enforcement of Dis-
cretion, 1973 Duo: L. J. 89, 131 -32; The Pah& Interest in Balanced Programming Content,
supra note 8, at 936 -37 (1972); Note, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory
After Red Lion, 38 Gnu. WAS L. REv. 947, 1003 (1970); Comment, 1970 L. & SOCIAL
ORDER 424, 432 (1970); Comment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 639, 642 (1974); Note, The Listener's
Right to Hear in Broadcasting. 22 STAN. L. Rnv. 863, 865 (1970).
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guaranteed to the public." The Court has been fearful of freezing
"this necessarily dynamic process into a constitutional holding.” 20
Thus, the ultimate limit on the FCC's power to implement a right of
access has yet to be judicially determined."
This comment will examine the statutory procedure by which
radio and television licenses are transferred in order to decide
whether, within the existing statutory scheme, a right of the public to
have access to the electronic media can be advanced which is conson-
ant with the evolving First Amendment guarantee of freedom of ex-
pression. The expressed interest of segments of the public to receive
certain desired entertainment programs will be the particular focus of
the comment. 22 Specifically, a succession of "format change" cases will
be analyzed. These cases involve the loss of a particular program for-
mat in a broadcasting community, upon transfer of a broadcasting
license. In responding to the actions brought by citizens, the Commis-
sion and the courts have focused on each of the various interests at
stake. The public, as consumer of entertainment programming, has
an interest in receiving a full spectrum and choice of entertainment
programs. The broadcaster has an interest in being able to transfer
his station in accordance with the statutory procedure established
therefor." The transferee has an interest in obtaining the station
without infringement of his own rights of expression by a require-
ment that he take the station subject to continuation of a prior for-
mat. The government has not only its own specific interest in simplify-
ing and ordering the transfer procedure, it also has its general in-
" In Columbia Broadcasting, the Supreme Court refused to accept the Democratic
National Committees contention that licensees must sell political advertising time to
anyone who seeks to purchase the time in order to facilitate the asserted First Amend-
ment rights of the potential advertiser. 412 U.S. at 121-31. The Court recognized that
should the advertiser's right to speak be enforced, the FCC would be required to "over-
see far more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters' conduct" and would neces-
sarily and impermissibly be engaged in the very editing process that licensees now per-
form as to regular programming. Id. at 127. Such involvement would be fraught with
the spectre of government censorship. Id. Yet the Court noted in dicta that the Con-
gress or the FCC could conceivably fashion a limited right of access that would be prac-
ticable, desirable and consistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 131. See also
Comment, A Proposed Statutory Right to Respond to Environmental Advertisements: Access to
the Airwaves After CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 234 (1974).
2 ° Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 132.
2 ' See Barron, The Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, supra note 5,
at 652.
" The dissemination of entertainment programming is protected by the First
Amendment to the same degree as is purely informational or political programming.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-502 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
Purely commercial speech is without First Amendment protection. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). Commercial speech is speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction and which does not, in transmit-
ting the commercial message, communicate non-commercial information. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1973).
23 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1970).
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terest in protecting the rights of all of its citizens, an interest which
draws it directly into the center of the conflicting public and private
interests at stake. 24 The position developed in these cases will be con-
trasted with the stance of the Federal Communications Commission
regarding the First Amendment issue of a public right to receive cer-
tain entertainment programs. Finally, an attempt will be made to pre-
sent a method for striking the proper balance between the competing
public and private First Amendment interests. 25
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
In 1934, Congress enacted the Communications Act" to remedy the
chaotic situation which had prevailed due to broadcast signal interference
among stations in the absence of federal regulation." Under this Act, the
airwaves, a valuable and scarce resource, remain in the public domain?"
However, this vital resource is allocated to private entrepreneurs by the
FCC in the course of licensing broadcasters to use the airwaves. 29 The
Commission's mandate from Congress is to allocate the airwaves and regu-
late broadcasters in the "public convenience, interest or necessity:" Thus,
only if the Commission makes a finding that the public interest will be met
thereby can a license be issued to an applicant" or renewed by a renewal
applicant."
"These five separate interests have been identified in Media and the First
Amendment, supra note 4, at 887-88.
25 Many commentators have expressed their views as to how competing First
Amendment interests of the public, the broadcasters and the government should be
balanced. For a helpful catalogue of law review references, see Lange, The Role of the Ac-
cess Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L.
REV. I, 2 n.5 (1973).
" 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
"See W. JONES, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY 'DIE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (1962), reprinted in Hearings on Federal Communications
Commission, Part I, Before Subcomm. No. 6 of House Select Comm. on Small Business, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. A87 (1966); Metzger & Burros, Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public
Interest: Federal Government and Civilian Use, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. I, 3-14 (1965).
" 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303, 307 (1970).
22 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970). It is the purpose of the Act to maintain control over all
channels of radio transmission, to provide for the use of such channels, "but not the
ownership thereof," by means of licenses which shall not "create any right, beyond the
terms, conditions, and periods of the license." Id. at § 301.
The denial of ownership rights in the licensee by Congress was upheld as con-
stitutional in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). Although
the licensee gets no unlimited and indefeasible property right in his license, the right
granted by a license is greater than a mere privilege or gratuity. L.B. Wilson, Inc. v.
FCC, 170 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1948). A license is a thing of value to the person to
whom it is issued and a business conducted tinder it may be the subject of injury. Id.
The most valuable right granted to the licensee is the right to freely.compete with other
licensees for advertising revenues and for audience support. FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, supra at 474-76. Thus, the license gives the broadcaster standing to sue
through interest in competition worthy of protection.
" 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970).
31 Id.
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The public interest standard, which is not susceptible of precise
or comprehensive definition, 33 lodges extraordinary power in the
Commission. For example, when a new license is to be granted, each
applicant for the license must first establish its legal, financial, and
technical qualification to operate a station." If two or more qualified
applicants are vying for the license of a particular station, then the
FCC conducts a comparative hearing to evaluate the relative merits of
each applicant so that the Commission can assure itself that the public
interest will be met by the grant of the license. 35 In such a compara-
tive hearing, the applicants and all other parties in interest," includ-
ing representative members of the listening and viewing public, are al-
lowed to participate and to introduce evidence on the factual and pol-
icy issues pending in the case in order to aid the Commission in effec-
tively representing listener interests. 36 Proposed program formats of
the competing applicants are major factors in determining the public
interest in a comparative hearing. 37 In addition, the Commission's
32 Id. 307(d).
33 The Su preme Court has not articulated a definition of the public interest stan-
dard. However, the Cotirt has held that the standard is not too indefinite a standard
fur fair enforcement. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953). Al-
though it has been observed that the Act's "public interest" standard might not be able
to survive the modern First Amendment notions of "chilling effect" or "breathing
space," Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(concurring opinion) this argument has not yet been accepted by the courts. In fact, the
courts have affirmed Commission authority to act under the "public interest" standard
in sweeping terms. Id. at 282.
" 47 C.F.R. § 73.24 (1973).
" 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). See note 66 infra for a fuller discussion of the nature
of a comparative hearing. A comparative hearing may also be held when the license is
sought to be renewed at the end of each three year term. Id. at § 307(a). In practice,
the process by which renewal applications are approved'has been inadequate to assure
that each individual station operates in the public interest. Renewals are approved by
delegated authOrity and granted to all stations in one state at the same time. Very few
applications—only those regarding which specific complaints are pending or involving a
broadcaster who broadcasts an excessive number of commercials—are given more than
routine approval. The Public Interest in Balanced Programming Content, supra note 8, at 953.
As a result, a renewal application is rarely subjected to the crucible of a comparative
hearing. FCC, Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma
Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d I, 24-25 (1968) (statement by Commissioners Cox and Johnson).
" 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). The Communications Act requires the FCC to
designate an application for hearing if a substantial and material question of fact is pre-
sented or if the Commission is unable "fur any reason" to find that the public interest
would be served by granting the application. See Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC. 359 F.2d 994, 1000-006 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
32 Note, 77 HAM'. L. RE Y. 701, 702 (1964). The factors considered by the Com-
mission in determining a license grant in a comparative proceeding are: (I) diversifica-
tion of control of the media of mass communications, (2) full-time participation in sta-
tion operation by owners, (3) proposed program service, (4) past broadcast record, (5)
efficient use of frequency, (6) character of licensee, and (7) miscellaneous factors to be
considered on an ad hoc basis. FCC, Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I
F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). These various factors do not have absolute values and one factor
may be of greater or lesser importance in any given factual situation. Id. at 393.
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guideline for broadcasters, that certain types of formats be developed
for airing," and its additional requirement that a licensee ascertain
the needs of his community before he formulates his programming, 3"
are each designed to insure the public's right to receive a "market-
place of ideas "."
Although the public interest standard leaves wide discretion in
the Commission, it does not confer unlimited power. 4 ' Two important
limitations are imposed on the Commission's power to regulate by the
Communications Act. First, Congress has determined that the princi-
ple of free competition is to continue untrammelled in the broadcast-
ing industry.' Thus, the Commission cannot act in the public interest
and simultaneously encourage or condone anti-competitive policies. 43
38 FCC, Network Programming Inquiry: Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed.
Reg. 7291 (1960) (en bane). The major elements usually necessary to meet the public
interest, needs and desires of a community have included: (I) opportunity for local ex-
pression, (2) development and use of local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) relig-
ious programming, (5) educational programming, (6) public affairs, (7) editorialization
by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10) news programs, (I I)
weather and market reports, (12) sports, (13) service to minority groups and (14) enter-
tainment programming. Id. at 7295.
The Commission denies any intent on its part to qualitatively evaluate program
content. Id. at 7293. However, the suggestion has been advanced by at least one com-
mentator that qualitative standards be adopted by the Commission to regulate program
content. Comment, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory After Red Lion,
supra note 18, at 1002-03.
From one point of view these quantitative standards are an insistence on an
adherence to balanced programming. The Public Interest In Balanced Programming Con-
tent, supra note 8, at 940-41; Note, 77 Hake. L. Riw. 701, 704 (1964). Yet the program
types enumerated as usually necessary to service the public, far from serving the needs
of the Commission, reflect the basic programming interests of the public as observed by
licensees before the adoption of program types. Cox, The FCC, the Constitution, and Re-
ligious Broadcast Programming, 34 GE°, WASII. L. Rev. 196, 199-201 (1965).
39 FCC, Network Programming Inquiry: Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed.
Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960) (en bane). See also Suburban Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C. 1021
(1961), affil sub nom, Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
821 (1962); KSAN, Inc., 30 F.C.C.2d 907 (1971); City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412
(1969). Yet the Commission has consistently refused to embrace entertainment pro-
gramming within the needs of the community to be ascertained by ihe licensee. FCC,
Primer on Ascertain meat of Community' Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27
F.C.C.2d 650, 656 (1971).
" Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(concurring opinion). But see Media and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 992.
" Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 285 (1933); Yankee Network, Inc v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
42 47 U.S.C. §§ 313, 314 (1970). Under the Communications Act, common car-
riers are granted monopoly status because competition in the areas of telephone, tele-
graph and transoceanic cable services would be wasteful. See Barron, The Fairness Doc-
trine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 694 (1975).
Yet Congress has declared that station licensees are not common carriers. 47 U.S.C. §
153(h) (1970). By applying the antitrust laws to broadcasting, Congress has also deter-
mined that free competition was to be promoted in the broadcast industry and that no
monopoly interest was being created in any station licensee.
' 3 For example, the Commission's policy with respect to maintaining diversity of
ownership of stations is directed to ensuring perpetuation of healthy competition in the
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Second, section 326 of the Act prohibits any form of censorship or in-
terference with free speech by the FCC." This section was originally
designed to meet the possibility that government might directly in-
fringe on a broadcaster's freedom of expression by compelling or cen-
soring certain political broadcasting. 45 Although section 326 was not
intended to address the Commission's potential for regulating the
specific content of non-political programs, the section does exist as a
buttress to the First Amendment against this kind of abusive govern-
ment interference.'"
The Act also establishes a separate procedure governing trans-
fers of station licenses.' A transfer application is submitted to the
Commission whenever a licensed broadcaster wishes to sell or give his
interest in the license to another who will continue program service
on the channel assigned to the licensee. As with grants or renewals,
the Commission is to approve transfers only if it finds that the "public
convenience, interest or necessity will he served thereby. ”48
Prior to 1952, the Commission effectuated the public interest by
considering proposed transfers in the context of a comparative
hearing.'" In these comparative hearings, persons other than the
market place. See Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give
the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
"See 67 Cong. Rec. 12,356 (1926) (remarks of Senator Dill).
" Exemplary of the inherent dangers in government regulation of program con-
tent are those enunciated by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Columbia
Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 148-70. Direct review by the Commission of program content
would make broadcasters less willing to experiment with such content out of fear of
jeopardizing their licenses. Id. at 164. Also, the licensee would be made "an easy victim
of political pressures." /d. Deception in government might go unearthed if the govern-
ment could regulate program content. Id. at 165. Indirectly, the liberty of the citizenry
would be undermined. Id. at 167.
47 47 U.S.C. § 310(h) (1970) provides:
No construction permit or station license, or any rights thereunder,
shall be transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or
involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any cor-
poration holding such permit or license, to any person except upon applica-
tion to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that the pub-
lic interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby. Any such
application shall be disposed of as if the proposed transferee or assignee
were making application under section 308 of this title for the permit or
license in question; but in acting thereon the Commission may not consider
whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity might be served by the trans-
fer, assignment, or disposal of the permit or license to a person other than the pro-
posed transferee or assignee.
(Emphasis supplied).
" See unemphasized portion at note 47 supra.
"See Wall & Jacob, Communications Act Amendments, 1952—Clarity or Ambiguity, 41
Geo. L.J. 135, 151 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Communications Act Amendments).
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licensee's proposed transferee could bid on and be awarded the
license for the station proposed to be transferred." In 1952 the
scope of the Commission's evaluation of the public interest was se-
verely curtailed by an amendment to section 310(b) of the Act which
turned the transfer proceeding from a comparative to a non-
comparative one. The distinguishing factor between the two proce-
dures is that in such non-comparative proceedings, third parties can-
not be considered by the Commission.'' In commenting on the
amendment before its adoption by Congress, the FCC protested the
proposed change on the ground that it would permit a person to ob-
tain a valuable broadcast license and then auction it off to the highest
bidder." In the words of then FCC Chairman Coy, the amendment
would make "a mockery of comparative proceedings in which that
person has prevailed, upon findings of superior qualifications, over
competing applicants for facilities in a given community!"53 The
Commission feared that it would be unable to fully effectuate its pol-
icy that the public receive a multitude of voices if it were limited to an
evaluation of the programming proposal of the proposed transferee
in a non-comparative proceeding." However, in debate on the pro-
5 " The former subsection (b) read:
The station license required hereby, the frequencies authorized to be used
by the licensee, and the rights therein granted shall not be transferred, as-
signed, or in any manner either voluntarily or involuntarily disposed of, or
indirectly by transfer of control of any corporation holding such license, to
any person, unless the Commission shall, after securing full information,
decide that said transfer is in the public interest and shall give its consent
in writing.
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, Title Ill, Part I, § 310, 48 Stat. 1086, as amended 47
U.S.C. § 3100)) (1970). The statute did not directly authorize a comparative hearing,
but neither did it foreclose the possibility of one. No legislative history on the enact-
ment of the former section 310(b) explains why Congress initially allowed the potential
for a comparative proceeding in a transfer situation. However, it appears that Congress
did not recognize that it had incorporated the possibility of such a hearing until the
Commission began operating the transfer as a comparative proceeding in the late thir-
ties. Communications Act Amendments, supra note 49, at 151.
" 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1970), formerly Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 8, 66 Stat.
716. See emphasized portion of statute in note 47 supra.
"Statement by Hon. Wayne Coy, FCC, Hearings before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on S. 658 (Amending Communications Act of 1934), 82d Cong„ 1st
Sess. 73 (1951).
"Id. The Commission objected to the amendment on the grounds that by limit-
ing its consideration of a proposed transfer solely to the qualifications of the transferee,
the amendment would deprive the Commission of its control over trafficking in radio
licenses. Id. Trafficking is the act of obtaining licenses for sale rather than service and is
condemned because "'a government license granted in reliance on an applicant's stated
intention to operate shim Id not, instead. be bartered away fur profit.'" Crowder v.
FCC. 399 12.2d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoting WMIE-TV, 1I R.R. 1091, 1098
(1955). Subsequent to 1952, the Commission enacted regulations directly addressed to
the problem of trafficking, 47 C.F.R. 1.597 (1974).
"Statement by Hon. Wayne Coy, then Chairman, FCC Hearings before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 658 (Amending Communications Act of 1934), 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 74 (1951).
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posed amendment, certain Congressmen argued that employment by
the Commission of the comparative procedure constituted "an unwise
invasion by a Government agency into private business practice." 55 As
a result, under the amended section 310(b), the FCC must now limit
its consideration of the public interest as though the proposed trans-
feree were the sole person interested in securing the license.
II. THE "LOSS OF FORMAT" CASES
The 1952 amendment of section 310(b) into a non-comparative
hearing procedure and the 1966 landmark 'decision of Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC," in which
representative members of the listening public were recognized to
have standing to challenge orders of the FCC and to participate in a
comparative hearing conducted by the Commission," have combined
to produce a flurry of litigation in which the right of access has been
asserted and developed. In particular, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has faced a series of challenges by citizens
groups to transfers under section 310(b) which would cause the loss of
a unique or distinctive format." These challenges reflect a demand
for diversity in broadcast entertainment formats. In response to these
listeners' actions, the court has accepted the proposition that there is a
public interest in a diversity of broadcast entertainment formats. 59
Each significant section 310(b) case decided by the District of
Columbia Circuit in the last seven years will be reviewed to determine
the import and effect of current judicial thought in this complex area
where statutory interpretation, administrative responsibilities and
constitutionally protected interests coalesce.
In Joseph v. FCC" the Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia was presented with a challenge to an order of the FCC issued
under section 310(b) approving the transfer of WFMT(FM), a fine
arts radio station in Chicago. The issue in Joseph, raised by fifteen in-
dividual listeners and a Citizens' Committee to Save WFMT (FM)
(Chicago Citizens' Committee), was whether the Commission could
approve the assignment without holding a comparative hearing on the
question of diversity of control of communication power which was
raised by the proposed transfer. 6 ' The court held that where the
"SEN. REP. No.44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).
" 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"Id. at 1005.
" The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has exclusive juris-
diction over appeals from Commission licensing decisions. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970).
"See text accompanying note 74 infra.
"404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
61 Despite the fact that the Tribune Company, a large Chicago newspaper, oper-
ated through subsidiaries an AM radio station and a television station in Chicago, pub-
lished two widely circulated Chicago newspapers, and had other substantial broadcast-
ing interests outside of Chicago, the FCC approved the assignment without the benefit
of an evidentiary hearing as to whether the transfer would serve the "public interest,
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Commission does not state the facts upon which it relies for its find-
ing that the public interest will be vindicated by the proposed trans-
fer, such a finding cannot be inferred without an evidentiary
hearing. 62 The court reasoned that the Commission is required by the
transfer proceeding established in section 310(b) to find that the
transfer is in "the public interest, convenience and necessity.""" Since
the public has an interest in the Commission's providing the "widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources"," the FCC must consider the diminution of sources and the
effect thereof' on the welfare of the public." Under section
309(e)—the section which provides for a comparative hearing, if a
"substantial and material question of fact is presented" or if the FCC
is for any reason unable to make the prescribed finding—"it shall
formally designate the application for a hearing."" Thus, Joseph estab-
lished that the public interest finding imposed on the Commission by
section 310(b) necessitates a comparative evidentiary hearing—in
which representative members of the public would have a
voice—where the Commission cannot support by its own findings its
decision to approve the transfer of a station.
In 1970 the court decided Citizens Committee to Preserve the. Voice of
the Arts in Atlanta on WGKA-AM and FM v. FCC" (Atlanta). A volun-
tary association of citizens (Atlanta Citizens' Committee) challenged
FCC approval" of the transfer of WGKA in Atlanta, that city's only
convenience and necessity." FCC, Assignment of License and Transfer of Control, 12
F.C.C.2d 1023 (1968). The Commission decided the case directly contrary to its own
proposed rule that the grant of a license to such a highly concentrated applicant would
be, on its face, against public interest. 404 F.2d at 212. The diversity of ownership rules
promulgated by the Commission are found in 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.240(a), 73.35(a),
73.636(a) (1973).
" 404 F.2d at 211-12. The court of appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing by the FCC on the question of whether an assignment to such a concentrated
transferee would be in the public imerest. Id.. The court noted that where Congress re-
quires a finding as to the public interest, as it does in section 310(b), its instruction is
not to be ignored or given only lip service. Id. at 211.
66 See unemphasized portion at note 47 supra. The full import of foseph did not
become clear until two years later when the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit decided Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta
on WGKA-AM and FM v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
" Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945).
"Joseph, 404 F.2d at 211.
6°47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). The evidentiary hearing resembles a civil proceed-
ing among litigants. The parties use such civil procedures as depositions, exchange of
exhibits, and prehearing conferences. 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1970); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-1.363
(1974). Without an evidentiary hearing, the Commission is acting similar to a court
which disposes of a case on a directed verdict or a summary judgment. In an eviden-
tiary bearing, however, the administrative action is more akin to a judicial case which is
being tried by the trier of fact. For a more complete discussion of the formal elements
of comparative hearings, see Schilz, New Techniques for Expediting Hearings in FCC Pro-
ceedings, 55 Cor.uNt. L. REV, 830 (1955); d: Communications Act Amendments, supra note 49,
at 145-51.
°' 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
68 Glenkaren Associates, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 13 (1969).
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classical music station, to a transferee who intended to offer a format
comprised of a "blend of popular favorites, Broadway hits, musical
standards, and light classics." 69 The issue in Atlanta was whether the
Commission had to hold an evidentiary hearing before approving a
transfer of the station which would result in the loss of a unique
program format.'"
In holding that an evidentiary hearing was required, the District
of Columbia Circuit found that substantial and material questions of
fact were raised by the Atlanta Citizens' Committee with respect to
three matters: the financial necessity for the format change,n the ac-
curacy of interviews with prominent citizens pertaining to the reten-
tion of the classical music format" and the extent to which daytime
listeners in Atlanta were provided with classical music from a non-
Atlanta source. 73 With respect to the- first factual issue requiring a
hearing, the court stated that the public interest requires "all major
aspects of contemporary culture to be accommodated by the
commonly-owned public resources whenever that is technically and
economically leasible." 74 If, on remaned, the classical format was found
to be "economically feasible" the Committee might prevail on this
point in preventing the transfer unless it could be shown that adop-
tion of another format would produce greater profits for the
transferee." In regard to the second factual issue, the Commission
would have to determine whether there was any misrepresentation in-
volved in the transferee's preference survey of community leaders."
Finally, in dealing with the third factual issue, the FCC would have to
determine the scope of the coverage provided Atlanta citizens by a
nearby station, which also broadcast classical music. 77
The court in Atlanta also directed the Commission's attention to
four factors which the Commission would have to consider in format
6" 436 F.2d at 265. The Committee laid great stress on the fact that out of all of
Atlanta's many AM and ,EM stations, only WGKA played classical music. Id. at 266.
Also, a statistical survey of "program preferences" voluntarily undertaken by the trans-
feree showed that 16% of the surveyed citizens of Atlanta were devoted to the classical
format. Id. at 267,
'" Id. at 265.
Ti The Commission had assumed that the transfer was necessary because the fi-
nancial reports of the station showed that expenditures exceeded revenues by a net fig-
ure of $20,635 for the six yews preceding the proposed transfer. Id. at 269. The
Committee maintained that these figures reflected a substantial capital eximnditure in
enlarging the physical plant of the station and was not a proper index of the operating
profitability of the classical format. Id.
72 Id. at 270-71.
"Id. at 271.
" Id. at 269.
"Id. at 270. Greater profitability in and of itself would not be dispositive of this
issue. Id.
"Id. at 271.
" Id. The intimation was clear that if this station provided substantially the same
service to Atlanta that WGKA provided, the Committee would fail in its challenge to
the format change. Id.
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changes arising from transfer applications where a unique program
format would be lost: (1) the length of time which the format has
been broadcast on the station; (2) the availability of substantially simi-
lar programming in the community; (3) the percentage of the public
preferring the endangered format; and (4) the economic feasibility of
continuing the desired format.'" However, Atlanta left several impor-
tant questions unresolved. Particularly elusive was the court's
"economic feasibility" standard. What is the minimum level of "prof-
itability" which determines whether a license may be transferred?
Also clouded was the future of ascertainment surveys. Would a pref-
erence study of community tastes by a transferee be required or was
such a study merely evidence which a potential transferee could vol-
untarily offer? Finally, was the Atlanta decision a radical departure
from the Commission policy" that entertainment programming
should be left to the business judgment of the licensees? Or, had the
decision only required remand because the Commission had not re-
viewed the record closely enough?
No guidelines were provided On these questions and none were
forthcoming from the court until 1973. 8 " In that year the District of
Columbia Circuit decided two cases, Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc.
v. FCC" and Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC", which
narrowed and clarified the impact of the Atlanta decision. The issue in
each case again was whether the FCC was required to hold evidentiary
hearings before approving a proposed transfer which would entail the
loss of a unique program format."
In Lakewood, the transfer of KBTR(AM), which would be
changed from an "all news" format, to a "country and western music"
"Id. at 269 - 72. Note, The Public Interest in Balanced Programming Content: The
Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcasters' Format Changes, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 933, 952
(1972).
7" Palmetto Broadcasting Co. (WDKD), 33 F.C.C. 250, 257 (1962), reconsideration
denied, 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963), affil sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
" One case decided in the intervening years added little by way of defining
Atlanta. Sentinel Heights FM Broadcasters, Inc. (WONO-FM), 29 F.C.C.2d 83 (1971),
entailed the transfer of a classical music station which had broadcast that format for
seven years prior to the proposed transfer. The transferee proposed to reduce classical
programming from twenty-four hours a day to six hours a day. Id. The case was sub-
stantially similar to Atlanta, and the court of appeals, in a per curiam order, remanded
the case to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing citing Atlanta. Citizens Comm.
To Preserve Present Programming of WONO (FM) v. FCC, No. 71-1336 (D.C. Cir.,
May 13, 1971).
"' 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
82 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" Lakewood, 478 F.2d at 921, Progressive Rock, 478 F.2d at 927. In each case, the
court recognized that its scope of review : was limited to determining whether the
Commission's determination was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Lakewood, 478
F.2d at 925; Progressive Rock, 478 F.2d at 934. In the area of the Commission's specialty,
the court defers to the expertise and experience of the agency. Progressive Rock, 478
F.2d at 934 n.25.
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format was challenged by a would-be competitor in the country and
western market and a Denver citizens' committee. 84 In holding that no
material and substantial questions of fact existed that would require
an FCC evidentiary hearing, 85 the court rejected the challengers' at-
tempt to bring their case within the decision in Atlanta." The challen-
gers argued that Atlanta stood for the proposition that no Commission
determination of public interest could be made without a survey of
community preferences. This rule was violated in the present case, the
challengers contended, because the ascertainment survey of commun-
ity problems conducted by the transferee was defective in that it did
not also elicit programming preferences. 87 In rejecting this argument,
the court distinguished Atlanta. There, the preference survey was
material only because it included a misrepresentation which was in-
tended to influence the FCC's decision on the transfer application."
Since the transferee is not required to submit program preferences,
their ommission in Lakewood was not a "material issue of fact" requir-
ing an evidentiary hearing." However, the court did hint that the
Commission might reexamine its policy regarding the ascertainment
requirement and require preference surveys."
84 478 F.2d at 922.
85 The challengers had claimed that two material questions of fact had to be
resolved—those concerning the alternative sources of "all news" formats and the finan-
cial viability of such a format. Id. at 924. The Commission had found that twenty other
Denver stations provided a total of 291 hours and 39 minutes of radio news per week.
Id. In addition, two Denver stations had become "all news" stations in prime listening
hours since the transfer had been approved. Id. n.10. On this record and with a "pains-
takingly thorough decision" of the Commission on the petition to deny before it, the
court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Commission's conclusion that
the public interest would be served by the transfer. Id. at 922. Therefore, the court af-
firmed the FCC order. M. at 925.
" Id. at 923-24.
" Id. at 924 n.12.
88 Id. at 923-24.
8 ° Id. The ascertainment procedure is meant to determine the problems of a
community, e.g., drug abuse, pollution, race relations, crime, as opposed to the pro-
gramming preferences of interviewees. Id. at 923. Charles A. Haskell, 36 F.C.C.2d 78,
84-85 (1972).
" While we have recognized that format changes may impair the public's
paramount interest in diversified programming, we have never attempted
to set out specific guidelines for achieving the marketplace ideal. The first,
tentative steps into this complex area of regulation must be taken by the
Commission. The Commission, and perhaps rightly so, appears loathe to
lightly undertake a task which smacks of establishing it as the "national ar-
biter of taste." The law in this area, following the lead of [Atlanta], is in a
state of transition. Whatever standards are set must remain flexible and
open to new information and new understanding.
So far we have only pointed out on a case by case basis those cir-
cumstances in which the Commission must take a closer look at the result
achieved by the give and take of the market environment and the business
judgment of the licensee—and must test this result against the public in-
terest in accommodating "all major aspects of contemporary culture." We
do not here intimate any views on how the balance of competing public,
38
PROGRAM DIVERSITY IN TOE BROADCAST MEDIA
In Progressive Rock, decided the same day as the Lakewood deci-
sion, the court further elaborated upon its decision in Atlanta and ar-
ticulated guidelines for the Commission in determining whether a
format change would be detrimental to the public interest. The pro-
posed transfer in Progressive Rock was of radio station WGLN (FM) in
Sylvania, Ohio, which operated a "progressive rock" format at the
time of the FCC approval order, but had operated unprofitably under
two previous formats."' The transferee proposed "middle of the road
music", including "some contemporary, folk and jazz, similar to what
[WGLN was then] programming." 12 After the Commission granted
the assignment in February, 1972, the Rock Citizens' Committee un-
successfully sought reconsideration by the FCC and a permanent de-
nial of the proposed transfer in order to preserve the progressive rock
format. An appeal was then brought in the circuit cou rt."'
In reviewing the FCC's action," the court in Progressive Rock
found that the Rock Citizens' Committee had raised substantial and
material issues of fact regarding two of the three issues cited in
Atlanta: (1) the economic feasibility of the progressive rock format and
(2) the availability of alternative listening sources. 15 With regard to the
economic feasibility issue, the court stated that the financial losses of
WGLN under the prior formats were only of minimal relevance: "the
question is not whether the licensee is in such dire financial straits
that an assignment should be granted, but whether the format is so
economically unfeasible that an assignment encompassing a format
change should be granted.""" In discussing the second issue, the
Commission argued in support of its refusal to insure the mainte-
nance of the specialized format that "the fewer the radio sources, the
more the tastes of the majority must be recognized ... ."97 However,
in considering this "greatest good" the court stated that the Commis-
sion must also consider "the multitude of non-Sylvania stations serving
the Sylvania residents.""
and public and private, interests hould be struck.
478 F.2d at 925 n.14.
"' Id. at 928.
"'
" 3 Id.
"Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F,C.C.2d 969 (1972).
"" 478 F.2d at 931-32.
"Id, at 931.
97 1d. at 933. The Commission attempted to support its argutnent by reference to
the fact that WGLN was the only station licensed in Sylvania, Ohio, and that the court
had stated in Atlanta that "if there were only one radio channel available to Atlanta" the
result might be different. 436 F.2d at 269. As the court observed in Progressive Rock:
"We suspect, not altogether facetiously, that the Coinmission would be more than wil-
ling to limit the precedential effect of [Atlanta) to cases involving Atlanta classical music
stations." 478 F.2d at 930.
" Sylvania, a suburb a Toledo, Ohio, was serviced by a multitude of Toledo sta-
tions. 478 F,2d at 933. At oral argument of the case, mention was made of a new
"progressive rock" station servicing the "roledo metropolitan area. This fact would have
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Lakewood and Progressive Rock proVide several of the answers
which had been missing in Atlanta. First, the "financial viability" stan-
dard was clarified. A factor in determining the economic feasibility of
the format would be the length of time that the format had been on
the air." Second, the availability of alternative sources criterion was
more particularly defined—the decision must be based on realistic,
and not technical, alternatives.'°° Finally, the court made clear that if
no objection were raised to a format change by a significant amount
of public protest, the Commission could properly approve the con-
templated transfer on the assumption that the proposed format is ac-
ceptable to the community. 10 '
The two cases appear to negate Atlanta's potential for serving as
the basis of a meaningful court-created First Amendment right of ac-
cess in the public to hear certain forms of entertainment. The court
refused to thrust upon the Commission the complex task of determin-
ing the entertainment preferences of a community, choosing instead
to merely intimate that the FCC should reconsider how the balance
should be struck between the competing public and private interests
at stake. It is thus apparent that under these decisions, the Commis-
sion, and not the court, would have to initiate any policy or procedure
to realize the right of access by the public to a specialized entertain-
ment format. Without such agency initiation, in the absence of the
abandonment of a unique format, the choice of program format
would be left to the discretion of the licensee.'"
This restrictive approach was abandoned, however, in 1974, in
Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC" (WEFM), where the District
of Columbia Circuit, in an en bane decision, expansively applied
Atlanta and broadened its potential impact. 1 "4 WEFM, an FM radio
station in Chicago, had continuously broadcast classical music since
the original FCC license grant was made to Zenith Radio Corporation
in 1940. 11 ' 5 However, since 1966, when Zenith had changed the opera-
tion of WEFM from a non-commercial to a commercial basis, advertis-
ing revenue had failed to cover the costs of operating the station.'"
As a result, in 1972, Zenith contracted to sell the station to GCC
to be taken into consideration by the FCC in the evidentiary hearing that the court or-
dered. IA at 932 n.16.
"" Id. at 933 n.22, See WCAB, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 743, 746 n.7 (1971).
1 " 478 F.2d at 932-33.
'' N. at 933 n.22 & 934.
"'See text accompanying notes 130-32 infra.
" 3 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1 i 4 Prior to the court of appeals decision in WEFM, only ex-Commissioner John-
son proposed an expansion of the Atlanta decision to cover a situation where the effect
of the proposed format change would lessen the diversity of radio service though not
necessarily totally eliminate a particular Ihrtnat. Zenith Radio Corp., 38 F.C.C.2d 838,
848 (1972) (dissenting opinion); TWIT] States Broadcasting, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 969, 973
(1972) (dissenting opinion).
'" 506 F.2d at 253.
'°°M. at 254.
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Communications of Chicago, Inc. who proposed a format of "con-
temporary" music which, in reality, would be rock music.'" A group
of Chicago area residents organized to contest the assignment and the
attendant format change and filed a petition with the Commission to
deny the transfer.'"" The Commission refused to grant the petition,
however, and in doing so determined that no hearing was required on
the public interest issue since two classical stations, WNIB(FM) and
WFMT(FM),'"" continued to serve the Chicago area and since WEFM
had previously been suffering continuous operating losses under its
old format."" After a petition for reconsideration was denied by the
Commission,'" the Committee appealed to the court of appeals. 112
The original panel of three circuit judges voted to sustain. the
Commission's aaion." 3 In a rehearing en banc, however, the court
set aside the FCC order and remanded the case for a hearing on the
substantial and material issues of fact which the court found had been
raised." 4
The three factual issues in dispute in the prior cases again
coalesce in the WEFM case. With respect to the issue of "financial via-
bility", the court summarized the teaching of its prior section 3I0(b)
decisions, stating that "it is not sufficient justification for approving
the application that the assignor has asserted financial losses in pro-
viding the special format; those losses must be attributable to the for-
mat itself in order logically to support an assignment that occasions a
loss of the format." 15 Furthermore, the court stated that it would be
fundamentally unfair to put the burden of disproving the causal rela-
tionship between the non-viability of the format and the financial los-
ses of the transferor on the citizens because there is no procedural
means for them to gain access to the confidential financial reports of
" 7 Id. at 254 n.4.
"Id. at 253. It is unclear on the record how the Committee discovered the
proposed format change. Although 47 C.F.R. § 1.580(4) (1974) requires that a pro-
posed assignment be broadcast over the station and published in one of the daily news-
papers in the community in which the station is located, no announcement need be
made that the proposed assignment involves a change in format. 47 C.F.R. 1.580(1)
(1974). The Committee had also challenged the sufficiency of Ihe Commission's notice
requirements reganling a proposed format change. The court, deciding the case on
other grounds, did not reach this issue. However, the court intimated that the Commis-
sion would do well to reevaluate its present notice requirements. Id, at 268 11.35.
■" WFMT was the station involved in Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (1968). See
text at note 60 supra.
"1 " Zenith Radio Corp., 38 F.C.C.2d 838, 848 (1972).
'n Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223 (1973).
"i 506 F.2d at 249.
" 3 Id.
1 " In an order issued recently, the FCC designated for hearing the issues
specified in the court's decision. Zenith Radio Corp., 75 F.C.C. No. 971 (Aug. 22,
1975). The evidentiary hearing took place in Washington, D.C. on December 2, 1975.
Zenith Radio Corp., 75 F.C.C. No. 1631) (Sept. 25, 1975).
""Id. at 262.
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the transferor on file with the Commission. 16 The issue would thus
have to be determined in a hearing with the burden of proof on the
transferor."'
The recurring issue regarding the availability of alternative
sources for the endangered format provided the court with an oppor-
tunity to solidify an aspect of Progressive Rock into a holding. 18 The
court held that "the public interest implicated in a format change is
the interest of the public in the service area, not just the city of
license."'" Thus, unless the Commission has considered that the al-
ternative station reaches less than a substantial portion of the area,
and reasonably determined that the overall public interest is, on bal-
ance, better served by the transfer,"° it has not discharged its obliga-
tion to act in the public interest.' 21
Finally, the WEFM court addressed the problematic issue raised
1 " Annual, monthly, and related financial reports are required to be filed with
the Commission by 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.611, 1.785, 1.788 (1974). Congress has provided that
such financial dam is privileged and confidential and is therefore exempted from com-
pulsory disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(4) (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970). Discretion for
the disclosure of financial information has been reposed with the Commission and the
Commission has provided that financial information shall be made available upon re-
quest only under certain limited circumstances. 47 C.F.R. § 0.461 (1974). The seeker of
the data must show that the information sought "is a necessary link in a chain of evi-
dence that will resolve the public-interest issue." Sioux Empire Broadcasting Co., 10
F.C.C.2d 132, 134 (1967). Such a showing is reasonable in order to continue to protect
the confidentiality of the reports. However, it is apparent that it would be unusual for a
citizens' group to be able to make the "persuasive showing" required by the Commis-
sion. KSAN, Inc., 30 F.C.C.2d 907, 911-12 (1971); ROWE, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 305, 306
(1970). In practice, the FCC has adhered to very strict standards and denied requests
that were legitimate and would not have undermined the congressional intent to main-
tain the confidentiality in the discretion of the administrative agency. See KSAN, Inc.,
supra. The WEFM court has diminished the harshness of the FCC's position by switch-
ing the burden of proof on the substantive issue to the party whose financial reports
are privileged. 506 F.2d at 266.
" 7 506 F.2d at 266.
" 8 See text at notes 97-98 supra.
in 506 F.2d at 263.
"° Id.
"I id. at 263. On the record presented in WEFM, the court found that neither
WNIB nor WFMT were necessarily adequate or reasonable substitutes for the en-
dangered format. Id. at 255. WNIB, the Committee alleged, reached at most only 15%
of the area served by WEFM. Id. Without further elaboration, the Commission was un-
able to find that WNIB would ultimately serve substantially the same area served by
WEFM. Id. at 263. As to whether WFMT was a substitute for WEFM, the court dis-
agreed that its programming was classical in nature since the station refers to itself as
"an award-winning fine arts station." Id. at 264. See Joseph, 404 F.2d at 208. Against this
background, the Commission had to insure that the proponents of the transfer estab-
lished that WFMT is in fact a reasonable substitute for WEFM before it relied on the
affirmative of that proposition to avoid the necessity of weighing the public interest.
506 F.2d at 265. The court noted that the substitutability of WFMT's "fine arts" pro-
gramtning for WEFM's classical format might be demonstrated without an evidentiary
hearing. The Commission retains a great deal of discretion with respect to its ability to
make reasonable categorical determinations. Id.
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by a challenge to the veracity of the survey of community leaders.'"
As declared in Atlanta,' 23 clarified in Lakewood,' 24 and now restated in
WEFM,'" any misrepresentation made by the transferee in regard to
its voluntary ascertainment survey must result in a denial by the FCC
of the application.'"
Read narrowly, the WEFM case accomplishes no more than did
Atlanta. In both cases, material and substantial factual questions pre-
cluding a Commission finding on the public interest mandated a re-
mand for an evidentiary hearing. Arguably, WEFM did not expand
the "unique format" doctrine since, if WNIB and WFMT were not
reasonable substitutes for WEFM, the loss of WEFM would have con-
stituted the loss of a unique format. Yet it is probably that WEFM did
expand the unique format doctrine to cases where the loss of a "dis-
tinctive format" is involved.' 27 A "distinctive format"—one whose loss
would be felt by a specialized audience 128—is obviously broader than
a unique format since the former would not necessarily be the only
format of that sort available to the community."" In this sense, it is
arguable that WEFM did expand Atlanta.
A liberal construction of the WEFM opinion also indicates that
the District of Columbia Circuit is forcing the Commission into a posi-
tion where it must impose on the licensee the duty to encompass en-
tertainment programming preferences within the presently imposed
requirement of ascertaining the needs of a community.ta" This intima-
tion by the court stems, in large part, from the court's apparent diffi-
culty in reconciling the Commission's requirement that the needs of
the community must be ascertained with respect to news and public
affairs coverage' 3 ' with the Commission's policy that entertainment
1 " The Chicago Citizens Committee alleged that the FCC had deliberately misled
the community leaders it interviewed about its intention to change WEFM's hitanat. 506
F.2d at 266.
123 436 F2d at 270-71.
12.  F.2d at 923-24.
1 " 506 F.2d at 266.
11€ Id. In its petition for rehearing before the en bane court of appeals, GCC, the
proposed transferee, sought to introduce additional data to support the veracity of its
ascertainment survey. In the denial of the petition for rehearing, Chief Judge Bazelon
stated that the additional information might persuade the Commission that a hearing
was not necessary on this issue. Id. at 286.
On remand, the Commission denied GCC's petition for a Request For A Ruling
Concerning Its Community Leader Survey on the submission of affidavits alone. Zenith
Radio Corp., 75 F.C.C. No. 971 (Aug. 22, 1975) at 5. The Commission felt that no use-
ful purpose would be served by attempting to resolve this issue outside of the hearing
which would be held in any case. Id.
127 Recent Decisions, 9 GA. L. REY. 479, 493 (1975).
1 " 506 F.2d at 262. This is the same view which was proposed by Commissioner
Johnson in his dissent nom the Commissions order in the WEFM case. Zenith Radio
Corp., 38 F.C.C. 2d 838, 848 (1972).
1 " 506 F.2d at 262.
1311 Id. at 262, 267-68.
' 31 Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2(1 - 223, 230 (1973); FCC, Network Program-
ming Inquiry: Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293 (1960) (en bane).
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programming be left strictly to the exigencies of the marketplace' 32
since "[a]s a matter of public acceptance and economic necessity [the
licensee] will tend to program to meet the preferences of his area and
fill whatever void is left by the programming of other stations." 132
The court's position is in direct contradiction to the stance previously
taken in Lakewood that any right of the public to hear specialized en-
tertainment programs would have to be initiated by the FCC.'" Al-
though the WEFM court disclaimed that it was sitting to make radio
policy,'" fundamental disapproval of the Commission's policy of leav-
ing entertainment program format decisions to the discretion of the
transferee is apparent in the decision. It is thus obvious from the
opinion that the court is pushing the Commission to abandon its
laissez-faire policy with respect to entertainment programming.'"
I II.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In accommodating the right of a segment of the listening public
to receive a particular, desired format and in trying to remedy the in-
adequacies of section 3 10(b), the court of appeals has raised a basic
and problematic issue with respect to the First Amendment interests
of the licensee-transferor and his proposed transferee. Most trouble-
some in terms of traditional First Amendment concepts is the sugges-
tion in broad dictum in WEFM that "if the FCC is to pursue the pub-
lic interest, it may not be able at the same time to pursue a policy of
free competition. " 3r A departure from free competition to serve the
public interest has two distinct ramifications for the licensee-transferor
and his proposed transferee under WEFM. First, the transfer of the
license will be denied if the endangered format is "unique" or "dis-
tinctive" and is "financially viable."'" Therefore, the licensee-
transferor may be forced to continue broadcasting, at least until it is
no longer economically feasible for him to do so, despite his desire to
withdraw from an economically unattractive situation.'" Secondly, if
the station is granted to a transferee whose proposed programming
would not continue the desired format, he may be required to under-
take a survey to discover the program preferences of the community
in order to support his proposed programming.'" Application of
132 506 F.2d at 267.
"33 The WEFM court found it unnecessary to "wade into (the] deep waters" of
the First Amendment issues which its position raised, saying that "familiar First
Amendment concepts would, if anything, indicate a lesser—not a
greater—governmental role in matters affecting news, public affairs, and religious
programming." 506 F.2d at 267.
' ' 3 ' See note 90 supra.
' 35 506 F.2d at 267-68.
'" Id. at 267.
'" Id. at 267.
'Id. at 262.
' 3° Id. at 283-84.
"' Id, at 262, 266.
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both the "financial viability" standard and the requirement of the pre-
ference survey as suggested by WEFM"' will be examined in order to
focus on the First Amendment issues posed and the advisability of
continuing to adjudge these complex issues on a case-by-case basis.
Application of the "financial viability" standard may have the po-
tential of severely undermining the independence of the licensee.' 42
In those cases where the continuation, of programming for a minority
audience with specialized program preferences would not produce as
much advertising revenue as a format aimed at a majority audience,
the standard effectively imposes a ceiling on the profits that a licensee
can expect to make if he or his predecessors ever begin broadcasting a
specialized format. To that extent, the standard contravenes the legis-
lative choice that a licensee is not a common carrier and that free
competition should thus prevail in the broadcast industry." 2 Further-
more, the "financial viability" test allows a vocal and organized seg-
ment of the public to dictate, at least for the time being, what the
programming of the licensee will be despite the licensee's legitimate
economic interest in increased profits. These consequences are
nevertheless justified, the WEFM court implied, by the community's
interest in a specialized format."' However, as Chief Judge Bazelon
recognizes in his concurring opinion, if WEFM is not transferred,
Zenith could elect to abandon the classical format in favor of a more
profitable one and this modification of programming during the
license term would probably not be reviewed by the Commission.' 45
Therefore, at best, the promise held out to the citizens if the transfer
is denied is only that Zenith will continue operating WEFM. There is
no assurance that their preferred classical music will continue to be
broadcast on WEFM. If the court is earnestly concerned with the con-
tinuation of specialized formats where community support has been
evidenced, the "financial viability" standard may be an ineffectual and
inappropriate means to achieve that goal.
The imposition of an ascertainment survey which would include
the discovery of the community's program preferences is ostensibly no
more than a means to stimulate diversity of programming. However,
the duty may also have the effect of inhibiting the licensee from ex-
perimenting with innovative formats because the licensee's discretion
would be inhibited, with respect to adopting minority programming,
"' See text at notes 115-17 and 127.33 supra.
' 42 DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 745 (1975).
" 3 47 U.S.C. 4 153(h) (1970). See note 42 supra.
'" 506 F.2d at 267-68.
"'Id. at 283 (concurring opinion). See Note, The Public Interest in Balanced Pro-
gramming Content: The Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcasters' Format Changes, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 933, 939 (1972) (hereinafter cited as The Public Interest in Balanced Pro-
gramming Content). Although the Commission has the authority to consider modification
of programming every three years when the station license is sought to be renewed, as
a practical and usual matter the Commission does not do so. See note 36 supra.
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by the preferences so expressed. 146 A point of even greater concern is
that the imposition of the survey by the Commission could chill the
First Amendment rights of transferees. The Commission would have
the means at its disposal to require a preference survey without the
crucible of an evidentiary hearing except in those cases where sub-
stantial and material issues of fact are challenged by a citizens' group
dissatisfied with the factual conclusions of the ascertainment survey.
It should also be noted that the supervision of any preference
surveys would involve the Commission in an administrative
predicament.' 47 There are only two alternative means available to the
Commission by which to evaluate the data compiled from preference
surveys: qualitative means and quantitative means. If the Commission
adopts qualitative standards, it would be indirectly examining indi-
vidual program content and adjudging certain programming to be
superior to other programming. Such an approach would impermissi-
bly enthrone the Commission as the "national arbiter of taste.“I48 It
could also lead to violations of the censorship section of the Act 14°
and interference with First Amendment rights of the surveyor. A
similar predicament would arise if the Commission adopts quantitative
standards under which certain percentages of airtime for an indi-
vidual broadcaster or of formats for a service area could be required
by the Commission and allocated on the basis of the percentage pref-
erences indicated in the survey.' 50 This approach would also involve
the Commission in a supervisory role in the day-to-day operation of a
licensee's conduct because the Commission would be deciding on a
case-by-case basis what the licensee should broadcasts's' Such an ascer-
tainment requirement would not only inhibit the licensee from being
innovative in its choice of broadcast formats but it would also with-
"° See Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 230, 231 (1973).
"' A vivid illustration of a classic problem was present in the record of the
Atlanta case. The sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia was interviewed as a community
leader. He was asked his opinion regarding the proposed change on WGKA—FM from
classical music to a popular favorites format. His response indicated that he was very
sports minded and indifferent to the change since he regularly listened to sports pro-
grams. He did note, however, that in his opinion the proposed music format would be
well accepted. 436 F.2d at 266. The weight to be given to such imprecise input from
such interviews would make any administrative decision based on the preference study
extremely difficult. But see The Public Interest in Balanced Programming Content, supra note
146.
1i8 506 F.2d at 260.
119 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). See text at note 44 supra.
"° In 1971 the Commission proposed regulations establishing percentages of
television broadcast time and prime time relating to local programming "designed to
contribute to an informed electorate." FCC, Formulation of Policies Relating to Broad-
cast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d
580, 581 (1971). These controversial regulations, which have not yet been adopted or
implemented, are more fully discussed in Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present
Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV.
LIB. L. REV. 137, 170-78 (1975).
"' Columbia Broadcasting, 472 U.S. at 127.
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draw economic decisions from the licensee's discretion. 152 Withdrawal
of such licensee decisions would be the effective equivalent of an un-
constitutional intrusion into the very editing process that licensees
alone perfbrm as to their programming.' 53
Chief Judge Bazelon, author of the original panel decision al-
firming the Commission order in WEFM, specially concurred in the
remand by the en bane court.' 54 His concurrence contains a ventila-
tion of the underlying First Amendment issues inherent in the court's
decision.' 55 The premise for his opinion is that the scarcity of broad-
cast frequencies is the accepted rationale for permitting government
regulation of broadcasters: 53 He recognizes that the Commission
must evaluate the nature of programming presented by competing
applicants in a comparative licensing proceeding because the impor-
tant decision of how to allocate the scarce resource of the airwaves
cannot be made of "content neutral" standards "when the raison d'etre
of the grant of a license is the nature of the programming." 157 How-
ever, he would not require the licensee to air certain political views or
entertainment formats where a petition to deny transfer of the license
is submitted by citizens' groups, since the factual predicate for FCC
intrusion into programming decisions—competing applications—is
lacking in the present section 3 10(b) transfer proceeding.'" Bazelon
found it possible to join in the remand only because he was able, by
rather tortuous construction, to view the section 3 10(b) proceeding as
a comparative one in that the assignee and the assignor are
compared.'"
IV. SUGGESTED STATUTORY AMENDMENT
It is submitted that the court of appeal's imposition of restric-
tions on the transferor and the transferee is neither consonant with
the existing statutory framework nor tolerable in light of the impor-
tant First Amendment considerations involved. The statute is based
on the theory that the laisez-faire operation of the marketplace is suf-
" 1 Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 230 (1973).
183 Columbia Broadcasting, 472 U.S. at 126-27.
" 4 Id. at 268.
156 1d. at 270-83.
'"Id. at 270-78; Recent Decisions, 9 GA. L. Rev. 479, 495 (1975). See text at note
9 supra.
151 As Chief Judge Bazelon states: "To attempt to make the license choice on the
basis of content-neutral factors, if any exist, is analogous to choosing a relief pitcher on
the basis of his criminal record and off-season earnings." 506 F.2d at 279-80.
158 506 F.2d at 278. The distinction drawn by Chief Judge Bazelon between
comparative and non-comparative proceedings in this context is not altogether clear, al-
though he apparently believes that supervision of programming in a non-comparative
proceeding would constitute an unconstitutional interference with the broadcaster's
First Amendment rights.
"'Id. at 283. Chief Judge Bazelon finds the suggestion for this construction in
the Atlanta case. Id.
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ficient to protect the public's interest in diversified programming. '°°
If it is time to depart from this theory, the direction to be taken in at-
taining the delicate balance between the competing First Amendment
values at stake in the programming issue is a policy decision to be
made by the legislature, rather than by the judiciary.'" As the origi-
nal panel in the WEFM case admitted, at present [the courts] simply
do not know how to ideally resolve the conflict between diversity and
freedom from regulation."' 62
As Chief Judge Bazelon noted in WEFM, section 310(b) is a
"very unwise statute."'" The inadequacy of section 31004 lies in its
failure to allow the FCC to consider alternatives. The presently re-
quired non-comparative hearing prohibits the Commission from tak-
ing into account other potential buyers of the station and the possibil-
ity that a third party's proposed programming might obviate the loss
of a desired format. For example, assume that in the WEFM case a
corporation had been created, sponsored and funded by the citizens'
group which had expressed a willingness and ability to pay the con-
tract price for the station and to continue the desired classical format.
The Commission would be precluded, under the present statute, from
even considering such a happy solution to the problem raised by the
format disappearance. Similarly, the Commission would be foreclosed
from considering a third party, unaffiliated with the citizens' group,
who desired to continue the endangered format. Such a party might
be able to operate the station more profitably than the prior owner.
Or, the party might be perfectly willing to operate the station for the
limited profits that the format would generate. Indeed, he might even
be willing to operate at a loss.
There is, however, the potential for changing a section 310(b)
procedure into one more conducive to accommodating the public's in-
terest in receiving a spectrum of entertainment programs, by
reamending the section so that the transfer procedure is once again
comparative.'" The current owner need not suffer a loss under this
procedure, however. At the time of seeking a transfer of the station,
the licensee's interest is no longer in his right of expression under the
First Amendment, but rather is in his property right in the station
and in his ability to dispose of it at the marketprice that he sought
160 See note 43 supra. justice Douglas remains a strong proponent of the laissez-
faire market in broadcasting. See Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 148 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). See also note 174 infra.
'°' It was Justice Black who articulated opposition to the expansion of judicial
power through the creation of new rights in the sensitive First Amendment area. Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (concurring opinion). His notion was that judicially-
created rights are often hard to give up, and may lead over time to an undermining of
the independence of broadcasters and to an ultimate erosion of freedom of speech and
press. Id, at 399-400.
506 F.2d at 252.
163 Id. at 283.
'" See text at notes 49-55 supra.
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from his original contractual party. If this property right is met by a
statutory amendment which merely substitutes one purchasing party
for another, the licensee's property ',right is accorded full protection.
The rights of the contemplated assignee would also be safeguarded
under the proposed section 310(b) amendment. There would be no
possibility that his independence would be undermined by requiring
him to continue a format which could place a ceiling on his profits.'"
His proposed programming would merely subject him to the same
full comparative proceeding that he would have undergone if he had
sought an initial grant of the license from the Commission.'"
It would also be unnecessary, under a proposed statutory
amendment to require any potential transferee to ascertain the listen-
ing preferences of the community. Thus, the Commission would not
be placed in the impossible position of having to supervise a prefer-
ence survey in the community.'" If a community were serviced by
numerous channels and a significant portion of the people in the
community'"" were actively opposed to the loss of a unique or distinc-
tive format,'" the transfer would be awarded to the competing trans-
feree whose programming would add more to the diversity of pro-
gramming in the "service area." 170 -Also, if this party proposed a format
change that would introduce "a new format for a larger segment of
the public that [was] not presently being served"'n he would prevail
over the group seeking to continue the presently desired format. For
example, if a classical format had a devoted following of 6 percent of
the listeners in a service area, the party who planned to program
for a larger percentage of listeners whose entertainment desires were
not presently being broadcast would be awarded the license. The de-
cision of whether to undertake a preference survey would remain a
voluntary business decision of the transferee. Pragmatically, however,
the applicant will probably utilize such a survey to estimate the poten-
tial success and profitability of his contemplated format to insure him-
self the best return on his investment.
Finally, the harshness of the laissez-faire marketplace—that
other stations in the broadcast area may not program for minority en-
tertainment preferences if it is more financially attractive to program
for majority tastes—would be undercut by a statutory amendment al-
lowing third parties to compete for the transferred station. Citizens'
groups which need not be concerned with the amount of profits that
165 Any requirement which materially affects the profit margin of the licensees
could have a chilling effect on the functional viability of the press and thus run afoul of
the First Amendment. See DeVore & Nelson, supra note 142, at 746.
"" See note 66 supra for a fuller discussion of the nature of the comparative
hearing.
'"' See text at notes 147-51 supra.
1 "" See Atlanta, 436 F.2d at 269.
in See WEFM, 506 F.2d at 262.
1 " See id. at 263-64.
See id. at 260.
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a particular format generates could organize non-profit organizations
to vie for the opportunity to run the station. Alternatively, citizens
might be able to interest certain broadcasters or other parties who
could afford to operate a certain desired format at a lower profit, or
at a loss, in competing for the transfer of the license and continuing
the format.
It is therefore suggested that the public's interest in receiving a
diversity of entertainment programming would be effectuated best by
reamending section 310(b) so that it would once again be a fully com-
parative proceeding. However, to revert to the former statutory lan-
guage providing for a comparative hearing•in all cases would put too
great a strain on the administrative resources of the Commission,
which in 1971 had to process well over one thousand requests for
transfer.' 72
 Thus, in consideration of this administrative problem, the
statute should be amended to reinstitute a full comparative proceed-
ing only when the loss of a unique or distinctive format is threatened.
This proposal raises a First Amendment question as to why the
amendment should concern only the loss of those formats which are
unique or distinctive. It should first be noted that most format
changes do not diminish the diversity of programming available.' 73
Second, although broadcasters may be primarily motivated to pro-
gram for majority audiences which will generate large advertising
revenues, there exists a market phenomenon whereby the remaining
licensees in a listening area will shift and modify their programming
to service the loyal but "disenfranchised" segment of the public and to
capture its potential appeal to advertisers.'" Thus, allowing the licen-
In In 1971, 1,091 requests for applications of transfer were approved by the
Commission. FCC, 37tit ANNUAL REPORT/FISCAL. YEAR 1971 50 (1971). The administra-
tive burdens entailed in processing the applications led the FCC to abandon the proce-
dure of giving third parties the opportunity to bid for any station proposed to be sold
before section 310(6) was amended in 1952. Wall & Jacob, Communications Act Amend-
ments, 1952—Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEO. L.J. 135, 151 n.57 (1953).
173 506 F.2d at 261.
14 Because the broadcasting industry is dependent on advertising revenue to
support its programming, broadcasters seek to program for the largest possible audi-
ence in order to attract the advertising dollar. Programs of interest to substantial minor-
ity interests are therefore not generally developed or broadcast. See Barrow, The Attain-
ment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 U. VA. L. REV. 633, 635 (1966). But this
premise of the economic imbalance of the industry cannot be accepted uncritically. In
1965, the Office of Network Study, a subdivision of the FCC, found in a study that
some advertisers had become aware of the fact that failure to reach minority audiences
with quality programming was contrary to their own economic interests. FCC, SECOND
INTERIM REPORT. TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT—PART II 26 (1965).
Numerous advertisers had expressed interest in sponsoring programs designed to reach
a limited audience. Id. at 32.
It has been the experience of the Commission that when a unique format with a
devoted following is abandoned by a station after a transfer of control, other stations in
the area often shift and modify their entertainment formats to fill the void. Zenith
Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 231 n.4 (1973). For example, following FCC approval of
plans to discontinue the "all news" format on KBTR(AM) involved in Lakewood and the
progressive rock format on WGLN(FM) involved in Progressive Rock, other area stations
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sees to make decisions based on their own understanding of, and ex-
pectations from, the marketplace will vindicate the listener's asserted
"right to hear" under most format changes following transfers of
licenses.
Under the proposed amendment it is only a limited right of ac-
cess that is granted to the public, because their right to direct the con-
tinuation of certain programming exists only in the rare instancet"
where a unique or distinctive format would be lost through the trans-
fer of a station license. Thus, the proposed amendment of section
310(b) is also in accord with the suggestion made by the Supreme
Court in CBS v. Democratic National Committee' !" that a limited right of
access can be devised by Congress that is both practicable and
desirable.' 77
V. CONCLUSION
Under the First Amendment, there are several competing in-
terests which have to be recognized and protected with regard to
license transfers that result in the loss of a unique or distinctive ert
tertainment format: the interest of the listening public in receiving a
full spectrum and choice of entertainment programs, the interest of
the broadcast licensee in making decisions as to formats without in-
fringement of his own freedom of expression, and the interest of the
government in providing a feasible method to transfer station licenses
and to promote the interests of all of its citizens. These competing in-
terests unquestionably give rise to "tight rope aspects" in any govern-
ment regulation of the broadcast media.'" However, the importance
of the First Amendment rights involved and the unique nature of the
broadcast industry demand that the tightrope be walked and appro-
priate government regulation be imposed. Although Congress has
attempted to strike a balance with regard to these competing interests
through the transfer procedure, the proceeding currently established
by section 310(b) of the Communications Act is ineffective in that it
fails to give adequate consideration to the interest of the listening
public. To insure that the public interest in receiving a broad spec-
trum of entertainment formats is effectively implemented, the Com-
munications Act must be amended to provide a comparative hearing
in all transfer proceedings where the loss of a unique or distinctive
entertainment format is threatened by a proposed transfer. According
proper priorities to each of the competing First Amendment interests,
as Chief Judge Bazelon has noted, "is a process which makes skeptics
of us all,"'" but before the courts drown in self-doubt, Congress
adopted these respective formats. Id.
'" 506 F.2d at 261.
176 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
'"Id. at 131.
"It at 105.
"" 506 F.2d at 283.
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should create this limited right of access in the public by amending
the procedure whereby licenses are transferred.
BARBARA E. BRUCE
Editor's note: As this issue was going to press, the FCC released a Notice of Inquiry
prompted by the decision in WEFAI for the purpose of examining "whether the Com-
mission should play any role in dictating the selection of entertainment formats." Notice
of Inquiry, FCC 75-1426 (DEL No. 20682) (Dec. 22, 1975), released January 19, 1976.
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